Microsoft identity platform access tokens

Access tokens enable clients to securely call APIs protected by Azure. Microsoft identity platform access tokens are JWTs, Base64 encoded JSON objects signed by Azure. Clients should treat access tokens as opaque strings, as the contents of the token are intended for the resource only. For validation and debugging purposes, developers can decode JWTs using a site like jwt.ms. Your client can get an access token from either the v1.0 endpoint or the v2.0 endpoint using a variety of protocols.

When your client requests an access token, Azure AD also returns some metadata about the access token for your app's consumption. This information includes the expiry time of the access token and the scopes for which it's valid. This data allows your app to do intelligent caching of access tokens without having to parse the access token itself.

If your application is a resource (web API) that clients can request access to, access tokens provide helpful information for use in authentication and authorization, such as the user, client, issuer, permissions, and more.

See the following sections to learn how a resource can validate and use the claims inside an access token.

Important

Access tokens are created based on the audience of the token, meaning the application that owns the scopes in the token. This is how a resource setting accessTokenAcceptedVersion in the app manifest to 2 allows a client calling the v1.0 endpoint to receive a v2.0 access token. Similarly, this is why changing the access token optional claims for your client do not change the access token received when a token is requested for user.read, which is owned by the MS Graph resource.
For the same reason, while testing your client application with a personal account (such as hotmail.com or outlook.com), you may find that the access token received by your client is an opaque string. This is because the resource being accessed has requested legacy MSA (Microsoft account) tickets that are encrypted and can't be understood by the client.

Sample tokens

v1.0 and v2.0 tokens look similar and contain many of the same claims. An example of each is provided here.

v1.0

eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsIng1dCI6Imk2bEdrM0ZaenhSY1ViMkMzbkVRN3N5SEpsWSIsImtpZCI6Imk2bEdrM0ZaenhSY1ViMkMzbkVRN3N5SEpsWSJ9.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.D3H6pMUtQnoJAGq6AHd

View this v1.0 token in JWT.ms.

v2.0

eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Imk2bEdrM0ZaenhSY1ViMkMzbkVRN3N5SEpsWSJ9.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.pj4N-w_3Us9DrBLfpCt

View this v2.0 token in JWT.ms.

Claims in access tokens

JWTs are split into three pieces:

  • Header - Provides information about how to validate the token including information about the type of token and how it was signed.
  • Payload - Contains all of the important data about the user or app that is attempting to call your service.
  • Signature - Is the raw material used to validate the token.

Each piece is separated by a period (.) and separately Base64 encoded.

Claims are present only if a value exists to fill it. So, your app shouldn't take a dependency on a claim being present. Examples include pwd_exp (not every tenant requires passwords to expire) or family_name (client credential flows are on behalf of applications, which don't have names). Claims used for access token validation will always be present.

Note

Some claims are used to help Azure AD secure tokens in case of reuse. These are marked as not being for public consumption in the description as "Opaque". These claims may or may not appear in a token, and new ones may be added without notice.

Header claims

Claim Format Description
typ String - always "JWT" Indicates that the token is a JWT.
nonce String A unique identifier used to protect against token replay attacks. Your resource can record this value to protect against replays.
alg String Indicates the algorithm that was used to sign the token, for example, "RS256"
kid String Specifies the thumbprint for the public key that's used to sign this token. Emitted in both v1.0 and v2.0 access tokens.
x5t String Functions the same (in use and value) as kid. x5t is a legacy claim emitted only in v1.0 access tokens for compatibility purposes.

Payload claims

Claim Format Description
aud String, an App ID URI Identifies the intended recipient of the token. In id tokens, the audience is your app's Application ID, assigned to your app in the Azure portal. Your app should validate this value and reject the token if the value does not match.
iss String, an STS URI Identifies the security token service (STS) that constructs and returns the token, and the Azure AD tenant in which the user was authenticated. If the token issued is a v2.0 token (see the ver claim), the URI will end in /v2.0. The GUID that indicates that the user is a consumer user from a Microsoft account is 9188040d-6c67-4c5b-b112-36a304b66dad. Your app should use the GUID portion of the claim to restrict the set of tenants that can sign in to the app, if applicable.
idp String, usually an STS URI Records the identity provider that authenticated the subject of the token. This value is identical to the value of the Issuer claim unless the user account not in the same tenant as the issuer - guests, for instance. If the claim isn't present, it means that the value of iss can be used instead. For personal accounts being used in an organizational context (for instance, a personal account invited to an Azure AD tenant), the idp claim may be 'live.com' or an STS URI containing the Microsoft account tenant 9188040d-6c67-4c5b-b112-36a304b66dad.
iat int, a UNIX timestamp "Issued At" indicates when the authentication for this token occurred.
nbf int, a UNIX timestamp The "nbf" (not before) claim identifies the time before which the JWT must not be accepted for processing.
exp int, a UNIX timestamp The "exp" (expiration time) claim identifies the expiration time on or after which the JWT must not be accepted for processing. It's important to note that a resource may reject the token before this time as well, such as when a change in authentication is required or a token revocation has been detected.
aio Opaque String An internal claim used by Azure AD to record data for token reuse. Resources should not use this claim.
acr String, a "0" or "1" Only present in v1.0 tokens. The "Authentication context class" claim. A value of "0" indicates the end-user authentication did not meet the requirements of ISO/IEC 29115.
amr JSON array of strings Only present in v1.0 tokens. Identifies how the subject of the token was authenticated. See the amr claim section for more details.
appid String, a GUID Only present in v1.0 tokens. The application ID of the client using the token. The application can act as itself or on behalf of a user. The application ID typically represents an application object, but it can also represent a service principal object in Azure AD.
appidacr "0", "1", or "2" Only present in v1.0 tokens. Indicates how the client was authenticated. For a public client, the value is "0". If client ID and client secret are used, the value is "1". If a client certificate was used for authentication, the value is "2".
azp String, a GUID Only present in v2.0 tokens, a replacement for appid. The application ID of the client using the token. The application can act as itself or on behalf of a user. The application ID typically represents an application object, but it can also represent a service principal object in Azure AD.
azpacr "0", "1", or "2" Only present in v2.0 tokens, a replacement for appidacr. Indicates how the client was authenticated. For a public client, the value is "0". If client ID and client secret are used, the value is "1". If a client certificate was used for authentication, the value is "2".
preferred_username String The primary username that represents the user. It could be an email address, phone number, or a generic username without a specified format. Its value is mutable and might change over time. Since it is mutable, this value must not be used to make authorization decisions. It can be used for username hints though. The profile scope is required in order to receive this claim.
name String Provides a human-readable value that identifies the subject of the token. The value is not guaranteed to be unique, it is mutable, and it's designed to be used only for display purposes. The profile scope is required in order to receive this claim.
scp String, a space separated list of scopes The set of scopes exposed by your application for which the client application has requested (and received) consent. Your app should verify that these scopes are valid ones exposed by your app, and make authorization decisions based on the value of these scopes. Only included for user tokens.
roles Array of strings, a list of permissions The set of permissions exposed by your application that the requesting application or user has been given permission to call. For application tokens, this is used during the client-credentials flow in place of user scopes. For user tokens this is populated with the roles the user was assigned to on the target application.
wids Array of RoleTemplateID GUIDs Denotes the tenant-wide roles assigned to this user, from the section of roles present in the admin roles page. This claim is configured on a per-application basis, through the groupMembershipClaims property of the application manifest. Setting it to "All" or "DirectoryRole" is required. May not be present in tokens obtained through the implicit flow due to token length concerns.
groups JSON array of GUIDs Provides object IDs that represent the subject's group memberships. These values are unique (see Object ID) and can be safely used for managing access, such as enforcing authorization to access a resource. The groups included in the groups claim are configured on a per-application basis, through the groupMembershipClaims property of the application manifest. A value of null will exclude all groups, a value of "SecurityGroup" will include only Active Directory Security Group memberships, and a value of "All" will include both Security Groups and Office 365 Distribution Lists.

See the hasgroups claim below for details on using the groups claim with the implicit grant.
For other flows, if the number of groups the user is in goes over a limit (150 for SAML, 200 for JWT), then an overage claim will be added to the claim sources pointing at the AAD Graph endpoint containing the list of groups for the user.
hasgroups Boolean If present, always true, denoting the user is in at least one group. Used in place of the groups claim for JWTs in implicit grant flows if the full groups claim would extend the URI fragment beyond the URL length limits (currently 6 or more groups). Indicates that the client should use the Graph to determine the user's groups (https://graph.windows.net/{tenantID}/users/{userID}/getMemberObjects).
groups:src1 JSON object For token requests that are not length limited (see hasgroups above) but still too large for the token, a link to the full groups list for the user will be included. For JWTs as a distributed claim, for SAML as a new claim in place of the groups claim.

Example JWT Value:
"groups":"src1"
"_claim_sources: "src1" : { "endpoint" : "https://graph.windows.net/{tenantID}/users/{userID}/getMemberObjects" }
sub String, a GUID The principal about which the token asserts information, such as the user of an app. This value is immutable and cannot be reassigned or reused. It can be used to perform authorization checks safely, such as when the token is used to access a resource, and can be used as a key in database tables. Because the subject is always present in the tokens that Azure AD issues, we recommend using this value in a general-purpose authorization system. The subject is, however, a pairwise identifier - it is unique to a particular application ID. Therefore, if a single user signs into two different apps using two different client IDs, those apps will receive two different values for the subject claim. This may or may not be desired depending on your architecture and privacy requirements. See also the oid claim (which does remain the same across apps within a tenant).
oid String, a GUID The immutable identifier for an object in the Microsoft identity platform, in this case, a user account. It can also be used to perform authorization checks safely and as a key in database tables. This ID uniquely identifies the user across applications - two different applications signing in the same user will receive the same value in the oid claim. Thus, oid can be used when making queries to Microsoft online services, such as the Microsoft Graph. The Microsoft Graph will return this ID as the id property for a given user account. Because the oid allows multiple apps to correlate users, the profile scope is required in order to receive this claim. Note that if a single user exists in multiple tenants, the user will contain a different object ID in each tenant - they are considered different accounts, even though the user logs into each account with the same credentials.
tid String, a GUID Represents the Azure AD tenant that the user is from. For work and school accounts, the GUID is the immutable tenant ID of the organization that the user belongs to. For personal accounts, the value is 9188040d-6c67-4c5b-b112-36a304b66dad. The profile scope is required in order to receive this claim.
unique_name String Only present in v1.0 tokens. Provides a human readable value that identifies the subject of the token. This value is not guaranteed to be unique within a tenant and should be used only for display purposes.
uti Opaque String An internal claim used by Azure to revalidate tokens. Resources shouldn't use this claim.
rh Opaque String An internal claim used by Azure to revalidate tokens. Resources should not use this claim.
ver String, either 1.0 or 2.0 Indicates the version of the access token.

Note

Groups overage claim

To ensure that the token size doesn’t exceed HTTP header size limits, Azure AD limits the number of object Ids that it includes in the groups claim. If a user is member of more groups than the overage limit (150 for SAML tokens, 200 for JWT tokens), then Azure AD does not emit the groups claim in the token. Instead, it includes an overage claim in the token that indicates to the application to query the Graph API to retrieve the user’s group membership.

{
  ...
  "_claim_names": {
   "groups": "src1"
    },
    {
  "_claim_sources": {
    "src1": {
        "endpoint":"[Graph Url to get this user's group membership from]"
        }
       }
     }
  ...
 }

You can use the BulkCreateGroups.ps1 provided in the App Creation Scripts folder to help test overage scenarios.

v1.0 basic claims

The following claims will be included in v1.0 tokens if applicable, but aren't included in v2.0 tokens by default. If you're using v2.0 and need one of these claims, request them using optional claims.

Claim Format Description
ipaddr String The IP address the user authenticated from.
onprem_sid String, in SID format In cases where the user has an on-premises authentication, this claim provides their SID. You can use onprem_sid for authorization in legacy applications.
pwd_exp int, a UNIX timestamp Indicates when the user's password expires.
pwd_url String A URL where users can be sent to reset their password.
in_corp boolean Signals if the client is logging in from the corporate network. If they aren't, the claim isn't included.
nickname String An additional name for the user, separate from first or last name.
family_name String Provides the last name, surname, or family name of the user as defined on the user object.
given_name String Provides the first or given name of the user, as set on the user object.
upn String The username of the user. May be a phone number, email address, or unformatted string. Should only be used for display purposes and providing username hints in reauthentication scenarios.

The amr claim

Microsoft identities can authenticate in different ways, which may be relevant to your application. The amr claim is an array that can contain multiple items, such as ["mfa", "rsa", "pwd"], for an authentication that used both a password and the Authenticator app.

Value Description
pwd Password authentication, either a user's Microsoft password or an app's client secret.
rsa Authentication was based on the proof of an RSA key, for example with the Microsoft Authenticator app. This includes if authentication was done by a self-signed JWT with a service owned X509 certificate.
otp One-time passcode using an email or a text message.
fed A federated authentication assertion (such as JWT or SAML) was used.
wia Windows Integrated Authentication
mfa Multi-factor authentication was used. When this is present the other authentication methods will also be included.
ngcmfa Equivalent to mfa, used for provisioning of certain advanced credential types.
wiaormfa The user used Windows or an MFA credential to authenticate.
none No authentication was done.

Validating tokens

To validate an id_token or an access_token, your app should validate both the token's signature and the claims. To validate access tokens, your app should also validate the issuer, the audience, and the signing tokens. These need to be validated against the values in the OpenID discovery document. For example, the tenant-independent version of the document is located at https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/.well-known/openid-configuration.

The Azure AD middleware has built-in capabilities for validating access tokens, and you can browse through our samples to find one in the language of your choice. For more information on how to explicitly validate a JWT token, see the manual JWT validation sample.

We provide libraries and code samples that show how to easily handle token validation. The below information is provided for those who wish to understand the underlying process. There are also several third-party open-source libraries available for JWT validation - there is at least one option for almost every platform and language out there. For more information about Azure AD authentication libraries and code samples, see v1.0 authentication libraries and v2.0 authentication libraries.

Validating the signature

A JWT contains three segments, which are separated by the . character. The first segment is known as the header, the second as the body, and the third as the signature. The signature segment can be used to validate the authenticity of the token so that it can be trusted by your app.

Tokens issued by Azure AD are signed using industry standard asymmetric encryption algorithms, such as RSA 256. The header of the JWT contains information about the key and encryption method used to sign the token:

{
  "typ": "JWT",
  "alg": "RS256",
  "x5t": "iBjL1Rcqzhiy4fpxIxdZqohM2Yk",
  "kid": "iBjL1Rcqzhiy4fpxIxdZqohM2Yk"
}

The alg claim indicates the algorithm that was used to sign the token, while the kid claim indicates the particular public key that was used to validate the token.

At any given point in time, Azure AD may sign an id_token using any one of a certain set of public-private key pairs. Azure AD rotates the possible set of keys on a periodic basis, so your app should be written to handle those key changes automatically. A reasonable frequency to check for updates to the public keys used by Azure AD is every 24 hours.

You can acquire the signing key data necessary to validate the signature by using the OpenID Connect metadata document located at:

https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration

Tip

Try this URL in a browser!

This metadata document:

  • Is a JSON object containing several useful pieces of information, such as the location of the various endpoints required for doing OpenID Connect authentication.
  • Includes a jwks_uri, which gives the location of the set of public keys used to sign tokens. The JSON Web Key (JWK) located at the jwks_uri contains all of the public key information in use at that particular moment in time. The JWK format is described in RFC 7517. Your app can use the kid claim in the JWT header to select which public key in this document has been used to sign a particular token. It can then do signature validation using the correct public key and the indicated algorithm.

Note

The v1.0 endpoint returns both the x5t and kid claims, while the v2.0 endpoint responds with only the kid claim. Going forward, we recommend using the kid claim to validate your token.

Doing signature validation is outside the scope of this document - there are many open source libraries available for helping you do so if necessary. However, the Microsoft Identity platform has one token signing extension to the standards - custom signing keys.

If your app has custom signing keys as a result of using the claims-mapping feature, you must append an appid query parameter containing the app ID to get a jwks_uri pointing to your app's signing key information, which should be used for validation. For example: https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/.well-known/openid-configuration?appid=6731de76-14a6-49ae-97bc-6eba6914391e contains a jwks_uri of https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/discovery/keys?appid=6731de76-14a6-49ae-97bc-6eba6914391e.

Claims based authorization

Your application's business logic will dictate this step, some common authorization methods are laid out below.

  • Check the scp or roles claim to verify that all present scopes match those exposed by your API, and allow the client to do the requested action.
  • Ensure the calling client is allowed to call your API using the appid claim.
  • Validate the authentication status of the calling client using appidacr - it shouldn't be 0 if public clients aren't allowed to call your API.
  • Check against a list of past nonce claims to verify the token isn't being replayed.
  • Check that the tid matches a tenant that is allowed to call your API.
  • Use the acr claim to verify the user has performed MFA. This should be enforced using Conditional Access.
  • If you've requested the roles or groups claims in the access token, verify that the user is in the group allowed to do this action.
    • For tokens retrieved using the implicit flow, you'll likely need to query the Microsoft Graph for this data, as it's often too large to fit in the token.

User and application tokens

Your application may receive tokens on behalf of a user (the usual flow) or directly from an application (through the client credentials flow). These app-only tokens indicate that this call is coming from an application and does not have a user backing it. These tokens are handled largely the same, with some differences:

  • App-only tokens will not have a scp claim, and may instead have a roles claim. This is where application permission (as opposed to delegated permissions) will be recorded. For more information about delegated and application permissions, see permission and consent in v1.0 and v2.0.
  • Many human-specific claims will be missing, such as name or upn.
  • The sub and oid claims will be the same.

Token revocation

Refresh tokens can be invalidated or revoked at any time, for different reasons. These fall into two main categories: timeouts and revocations.

Token timeouts

  • MaxInactiveTime: If the refresh token hasn't been used within the time dictated by the MaxInactiveTime, the Refresh Token will no longer be valid.
  • MaxSessionAge: If MaxAgeSessionMultiFactor or MaxAgeSessionSingleFactor have been set to something other than their default (Until-revoked), then reauthentication will be required after the time set in the MaxAgeSession* elapses.
  • Examples:
    • The tenant has a MaxInactiveTime of five days, and the user went on vacation for a week, and so Azure AD hasn't seen a new token request from the user in 7 days. The next time the user requests a new token, they'll find their Refresh Token has been revoked, and they must enter their credentials again.
    • A sensitive application has a MaxAgeSessionSingleFactor of one day. If a user logs in on Monday, and on Tuesday (after 25 hours have elapsed), they'll be required to reauthenticate.

Revocation

Password-based cookie Password-based token Non-password-based cookie Non-password-based token Confidential client token
Password expires Stays alive Stays alive Stays alive Stays alive Stays alive
Password changed by user Revoked Revoked Stays alive Stays alive Stays alive
User does SSPR Revoked Revoked Stays alive Stays alive Stays alive
Admin resets password Revoked Revoked Stays alive Stays alive Stays alive
User revokes their refresh tokens via PowerShell Revoked Revoked Revoked Revoked Revoked
Admin revokes all refresh tokens for the tenant via PowerShell Revoked Revoked Revoked Revoked Revoked
Single sign-out on web Revoked Stays alive Revoked Stays alive Stays alive

Note

A "Non-password based" login is one where the user didn't type in a password to get it. For example, using your face with Windows Hello, a FIDO2 key, or a PIN.

Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT) on Windows 10 are segregated based on the credential. For example, Windows Hello and password have their respective PRTs, isolated from one another. When a user signs-in with a Hello credential (PIN or biometrics) and then changes the password, the password based PRT obtained previously will be revoked. Signing back in with a password invalidates the old PRT and requests a new one.

Refresh tokens aren't invalidated or revoked when used to fetch a new access token and refresh token.

Next steps