SSL/TLS communication problems after you install KB 931125
This article provides a solution to SSL/TLS communication problems that occur after you install KB 931125.
Applies to: Windows Server 2008 R2 Service Pack 1, Windows Server 2012 R2
Original KB number: 2801679
After December 11, 2012, applications and operations that are dependent on TLS-based authentications fail may suddenly fail although they have no apparent configuration change. Some of the applications and operations that may fail include, but are not limited to, the following:
- Wireless network access that uses certificate-based authentication
- Wired network access that uses certificate-based authentication
- Client connectivity to Lync or to Office Communications Server
- Voice mail that uses Exchange Server together with Unified Messaging
- SSL-enabled website access
- Outlook logons
- OS boot delays (slow boot)
- User logons delays (slow logon)
Events that are logged in Windows or in application-specific event logs, and that either scope or definitively identify the symptom that is discussed in this article, include, but are not limited to, events that are listed in the following table.
|Event log||Event source||Event ID||Event text|
|System||Schannel||36885||When asking for client authentication, this server sends a list of trusted certificate authorities to the client. The client uses this list to choose a client certificate that is trusted by the server. Currently, this server trusts so many certificate authorities that the list has grown too long. This list has thus been truncated. The administrator of this machine should review the certificate authorities trusted for client authentication and remove those that do not really need to be trusted.|
|System||Schannel||36887||The following fatal alert was received: 47|
|System||NapAgent||39||The Network Access Protection Agent was unable to determine which HRAs to request a health certificate from. A network change or if GP is configured, a configuration change will prompt further attempts to acquire a health certificate. Otherwise no further attempts will be made. Contact the HRA administrator for more information.|
|System||RemoteAccess||20225||The following error occurred in the Point to Point Protocol module on port: VPN2-509, UserName: <username>. The connection was prevented because of a policy configured on your RAS/VPN server. Specifically, the authentication method used by the server to verify your username and password may not match the authentication method configured in your connection profile. Please contact the Administrator of the RAS server and notify them of this error.|
|System||RemoteAccess||20271||The user <username> connected from <IP address> but failed an authentication attempt due to the following reason: The connection was prevented because of a policy configured on your RAS/VPN server. Specifically, the authentication method used by the server to verify your username and password may not match the authentication method configured in your connection profile. Please contact the Administrator of the RAS server and notify them of this error.|
These problems may occur if you updated your Third-party Root Certification Authorities by using the December 2012 KB 931125 update package. The KB 931125 package that was posted on December 11, 2012, was intended only for client SKUs. However, it was also offered for Server SKUs for a short time on Windows Update and WSUS.
This package installed more than 330 Third-party Root Certification Authorities. Currently, the maximum size of the trusted certificate authorities list that the Schannel security package supports is 16 kilobytes (KB). Having a large amount of Third-party Root Certification Authorities will go over the 16k limit, and you will experience TLS/SSL communication problems.
If you use WSUS, and you did not install the December 2012 KB 931125 update, you should sync your WSUS servers, and then approve the expirations so that your servers do not install the update.
If you installed the December 2012 KB 931125 update package, you should use the following resolution to remove additional Third-party Root Certification Authorities on all servers that now have a large amount of Third-party Root Certification Authorities.
This solution removes all Third-party Root Certification Authorities. If your server has connectivity to Windows Update, it will automatically add back Third-party Root Certification Authorities as needed, as also discussed in KB 931125. If an affected server is isolated or disconnected from the Internet, you must manually add the necessary Third-party Root Certification Authorities back as you would have done in the past. (Or, you can install them by using Group Policy.)
To fix this problem, delete the following registry key:
To do this, follow these steps:
- Start Registry Editor
- Locate the following registry subkey:
- Right-click and then delete the key that is called Certificates.
Make sure that you make a backup of the registry and affected keys before you make any changes to your system.
These problems may occur if a TLS/SSL server contains many entries in the trusted root certification list. The server sends a list of trusted certificate authorities to the client if the following conditions are true:
- The server uses the Transport Layer Security (TLS)/SSL protocol to encrypt network traffic.
- Client certificates are required for authentication during the authentication handshake process.
This list of trusted certificate authorities represents the authorities from which the server can accept a client certificate. To be authenticated by the server, the client must have a certificate that is present in the chain of certificates to a root certificate from the server's list. This is because the client certificate is always the end-entity certificate at the end of the chain. The client certificate isn't part of the chain.
Currently, the maximum size of the trusted certificate authorities list that the Schannel security package supports is 16 KB in Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, and Windows Server 2012.
Schannel creates the list of trusted certificate authorities by searching the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store on the local computer. Every certificate that is trusted for client authentication purposes is added to the list. If the size of this list exceeds 16 KB, Schannel logs Warning event ID 36855. Then, Schannel truncates the list of trusted root certificates and sends this truncated list to the client computer.
When the client computer receives the truncated list of trusted root certificates, the client computer may not have a certificate that exists in the chain of a trusted certificate issuer. For example, the client computer may have a certificate that corresponds to a trusted root certificate that Schannel truncated from the list of trusted certificate authorities. Therefore, the server cannot authenticate the client.