How do you keep your organization's risk down

Much like physical safety, success in information security is defined more as an ongoing task of applying good security practices and principles and hygiene rather than a static absolute state. Reducing risk for your security program should be aligned to your organizations mission and shaped by three key strategic directions:

  • Building resilience into your cybersecurity strategy

  • Strategically increasing attacker cost

  • Tactically containing attacker access.

Resilience

Building cybersecurity resilience into your organization requires balancing investments across the security lifecycle, diligently applying maintenance, vigilantly responding to anomalies and alerts to prevent security assurance decay, and designing to defense in depth and least privilege.

Balancing your investments will help you both prevent cybersecurity attacks and rapidly restore normal operations in the event of a successful attack. By investing in both of these, you will reduce the risk your organization faces. The functions of the NIST map well to these dual goals:

  • Identify/protect: Understanding your posture, your attackers, and invest in establishing and improving controls to prevent attacks on data and systems over time. A defense in-depth approach can further mitigate risk including supplemental controls designed to handle the potential failure of primary control (for example, assuming network controls will fail and implementing endpoint and data security protections)

  • Detect/respond/recover: Stay vigilant so that when attackers do get access to systems and data, you can rapidly detect them and restore normal operations and security assurances

Increasing attacker cost

Cybersecurity attacks are planned and conducted by human attackers that must manage their return on investment into attacks (return could include profit or achieving an assigned objective). As you invest in security, you should carefully consider how you can damage the attacker's return on investment with your defensive investments.

The best way to damage an attacker's ability to successfully attack your organization is to increase their cost by preventing and detecting easy and cheap attack methods. This will rapidly increase the minimum attacker cost and make you a less attractive target overall (particularly to profit driven attackers). Some attackers like nation states have considerable resources for attack research and execution, but increasing their costs still affects how many successful attacks they can mount with the (large but) finite amount of talent and time available. Well-resourced attackers often have invested in building a library of advanced attacks, but typically hold them back until needed because using these methods risks "burning" them- exposing them to discovery and mitigation by vendors and target organizations. Removing cheap and easy attacks impacts the effectiveness of all attackers and lowers your risk overall.

This is a general mindset with many possible applications, but two concrete applications of this are:

  • Investment criteria: As you consider various security investments, evaluate whether the potential investments lower attacker cost overall (for example, does this security investment force an attacker to build or buy a more expensive option? Does it eliminate one of many cheap options on the attacker menu? Or does it only eliminate an expensive/rare attack method?)

  • Attack simulation goals: As you engage in penetration testing or red teaming activities to test, you should focus these teams on identifying and cataloging the lowest cost methods to get to business critical data so you can eliminate those first.

Containing attacker access

A containment strategy should attempt to limit an attacker's time and levels of privilege acquired within an environment. Containment is an important part of resilience and recovery. If an attacker is able to escalate privileges and/or remain undetected indefinitely, their scope of damage increases.

The actual security risk for an organization is heavily influenced by how much access an adversary can or does obtain to valuable systems and data. Your investments should be focused on ensuring your security measures constrain how much access an adversary gets to the environment during an attack operation and limit the privileges or permissions that an adversary gains:

  • Time: Limit how long the adversary can have access to your environment during an attack operation. This is primarily achieved through security operations that rapidly detect potential attacks, prioritizing potential detections so your team is focused on quickly investigating real attacks (vs. false positives), and reducing your mean time to remediate those real incidents.

    For more information on these goals and metrics, see the security operations section.

Privilege: Limit the privileges and permissions that an adversary can gain during an attack operation (by permissions and by amount of time that privileges are assigned). As attackers gain more privileges, they can access more target systems and data (or use those systems to continue to pivot within your environment). Your security strategy should be focused on containing those privileges with:

  • Preventive controls
  • Detection/response/recovery that is prioritized to focus on business critical assets and high amounts of permissions to assets typically IT operations roles.