Requirements and deployment planning guidelines for Windows Defender Device Guard

Applies to

  • Windows 10
  • Windows Server 2016

The information in this article is intended for IT professionals, and provides a foundation for Planning and getting started on the Windows Defender Device Guard deployment process.

Note  If you are an OEM, see the requirements information at PC OEM requirements for Windows Defender Device Guard and Windows Defender Credential Guard.

Hardware, firmware, and software requirements for Windows Defender Device Guard

To deploy Windows Defender Device Guard in a way that uses all of its virtualization-based security (VBS) features, the computers you are protecting must meet certain hardware, firmware, and software requirements. However, computers lacking some of the hardware and firmware requirements will still receive some protection when you deploy code integrity policies—the difference is that those computers will not be as hardened against certain threats.

For example, hardware that includes CPU virtualization extensions and SLAT will be hardened against malware that attempts to gain access to the kernel, but without protected BIOS options such as “Boot only from internal hard drive,” the computer could be booted (by a malicious person who has physical access) into an operating system on bootable media. For an outline of how VBS-related hardware strengthens the hardening offered by Windows Defender Device Guard, see Introduction to Windows Defender Device Guard: virtualization-based security and code integrity policies.

You can deploy Windows Defender Device Guard in phases, and plan these phases in relation to the computer purchases you plan for your next hardware refresh.

Warning

Virtualization-based protection of code integrity may be incompatible with some devices and applications. We strongly recommend testing this configuration in your lab before enabling virtualization-based protection of code integrity on production systems. Failure to do so may result in unexpected failures up to and including data loss or a blue screen error (also called a stop error).

The following tables provide more information about the hardware, firmware, and software required for deployment of various Windows Defender Device Guard features. The tables describe baseline protections, plus protections for improved security that are associated with hardware and firmware options available in 2015, 2016, and 2017.

Notes
• To understand the requirements in the following tables, you will need to be familiar with the main features in Windows Defender Device Guard: configurable code integrity policies, virtualization-based security (VBS), and Universal Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot. For information about these features, see How Windows Defender Device Guard features help protect against threats.
• Beginning with Windows 10, version 1607, Trusted Platform Module (TPM 2.0) must be enabled by default on new computers.

Baseline protections

Baseline Protections Description Security benefits
Hardware: 64-bit CPU A 64-bit computer is required for the Windows hypervisor to provide VBS.
Hardware: CPU virtualization extensions,
plus extended page tables
These hardware features are required for VBS:
One of the following virtualization extensions:
• VT-x (Intel) or
• AMD-V
And:
• Extended page tables, also called Second Level Address Translation (SLAT).
VBS provides isolation of the secure kernel from the normal operating system. Vulnerabilities and zero-days in the normal operating system cannot be exploited because of this isolation.
Firmware: UEFI firmware version 2.3.1.c or higher with UEFI Secure Boot See the following Windows Hardware Compatibility Program requirement: System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot UEFI Secure Boot helps ensure that the device boots only authorized code. This can prevent boot kits and root kits from installing and persisting across reboots.
Firmware: Secure firmware update process UEFI firmware must support secure firmware update found under the following Windows Hardware Compatibility Program requirement: System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot. UEFI firmware just like software can have security vulnerabilities that, when found, need to be patched through firmware updates. Patching helps prevent root kits from getting installed.
Software: HVCI compatible drivers See the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program requirements under Filter.Driver.DeviceGuard.DriverCompatibility. HVCI Compatible drivers help ensure that VBS can maintain appropriate memory permissions. This increases resistance to bypassing vulnerable kernel drivers and helps ensure that malware cannot run in kernel. Only code verified through code integrity can run in kernel mode.
Software: Qualified Windows operating system Windows 10 Enterprise, Windows 10 Education, Windows Server 2016, or Windows 10 IoT Enterprise

Important:
Windows Server 2016 running as a domain controller does not support Windows Defender Credential Guard. Only Windows Defender Device Guard is supported in this configuration.

Support for VBS and for management features that simplify configuration of Windows Defender Device Guard.

Important  The following tables list additional qualifications for improved security. You can use Windows Defender Device Guard with hardware, firmware, and software that support baseline protections, even if they do not support protections for improved security. However, we strongly recommend meeting these additional qualifications to significantly strengthen the level of security that Windows Defender Device Guard can provide.

Additional qualifications for improved security

The following tables describe additional hardware and firmware qualifications, and the improved security that is available when these qualifications are met.

Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1507, and Windows Server 2016, Technical Preview 4

Protections for Improved Security Description Security benefits
Firmware: Securing Boot Configuration and Management • BIOS password or stronger authentication must be supported.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS authentication must be set.
• There must be support for protected BIOS option to configure list of permitted boot devices (for example, “Boot only from internal hard drive”) and boot device order, overriding BOOTORDER modification made by operating system.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS options related to security and boot options (list of permitted boot devices, boot order) must be secured to prevent other operating systems from starting and to prevent changes to the BIOS settings.
• BIOS password or stronger authentication helps ensure that only authenticated Platform BIOS administrators can change BIOS settings. This helps protect against a physically present user with BIOS access.
• Boot order when locked provides protection against the computer being booted into WinRE or another operating system on bootable media.


Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1607, and Windows Server 2016

Protections for Improved Security Description Security benefits
Firmware: Hardware Rooted Trust Platform Secure Boot • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported. See the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program requirements under System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby
• The Hardware Security Test Interface (HSTI) 1.1.a must be implemented. See Hardware Security Testability Specification.
• Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) from Power-On provides protections against physically present attackers, and defense-in-depth against malware.
• HSTI 1.1.a provides additional security assurance for correctly secured silicon and platform.
Firmware: Firmware Update through Windows Update Firmware must support field updates through Windows Update and UEFI encapsulation update. Helps ensure that firmware updates are fast, secure, and reliable.
Firmware: Securing Boot Configuration and Management • Required BIOS capabilities: Ability of OEM to add ISV, OEM, or Enterprise Certificate in Secure Boot DB at manufacturing time.
• Required configurations: Microsoft UEFI CA must be removed from Secure Boot DB. Support for 3rd-party UEFI modules is permitted but should leverage ISV-provided certificates or OEM certificate for the specific UEFI software.
• Enterprises can choose to allow proprietary EFI drivers/applications to run.
• Removing Microsoft UEFI CA from Secure Boot DB provides full control to enterprises over software that runs before the operating system boots.


Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1703

Protections for Improved Security Description Security benefits
Firmware: VBS enablement of NX protection for UEFI runtime services • VBS will enable No-Execute (NX) protection on UEFI runtime service code and data memory regions. UEFI runtime service code must support read-only page protections, and UEFI runtime service data must not be exceutable.
• UEFI runtime service must meet these requirements:
    • Implement UEFI 2.6 EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE. All UEFI runtime service memory (code and data) must be described by this table.
    • PE sections need to be page-aligned in memory (not required for in non-volitile storage).
    • The Memory Attributes Table needs to correctly mark code and data as RO/NX for configuration by the OS:
        • All entries must include attributes EFI_MEMORY_RO, EFI_MEMORY_XP, or both
        • No entries may be left with neither of the above attributes, indicating memory that is both exceutable and writable. Memory must be either readable and executable or writeable and non-executable.

Notes:
• This only applies to UEFI runtime service memory, and not UEFI boot service memory.
• This protection is applied by VBS on OS page tables.


Please also note the following:
• Do not use sections that are both writeable and exceutable
• Do not attempt to directly modify executable system memory
• Do not use dynamic code
• Vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware.
Firmware: Firmware support for SMM protection The Windows SMM Security Mitigations Table (WSMT) specification contains details of an Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) table that was created for use with Windows operating systems that support Windows virtualization-based security (VBS) features. • Protects against potential vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime services, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware.
• Blocks additional security attacks against SMM.

Windows Defender Device Guard deployment in different scenarios: types of devices

Typically, deployment of Windows Defender Device Guard happens best in phases, rather than being a feature that you simply “turn on.” The choice and sequence of phases depends on the way various computers and other devices are used in your organization, and to what degree IT manages those devices. The following table can help you begin to develop a plan for deploying Windows Defender Device Guard in your organization.

Type of device How Windows Defender Device Guard relates to this type of device Windows Defender Device Guard components that you can use to protect this kind of device
Fixed-workload devices: Perform same tasks every day.
Lists of approved applications rarely change.
Examples: kiosks, point-of-sale systems, call center computers.
Windows Defender Device Guard can be deployed fully, and deployment and ongoing administration are relatively straightforward.
After Windows Defender Device Guard deployment, only approved applications can run. This is because of protections offered by the Hypervisor Code Integrity (HVCI) service.
- VBS (hardware-based) protections, enabled.

• Code integrity policies in enforced mode, with UMCI enabled.
Fully managed devices: Allowed software is restricted by IT department.
Users can request additional software, or install from a list of applications provided by IT department.
Examples: locked-down, company-owned desktops and laptops.
An initial baseline code integrity policy can be established and enforced. Whenever the IT department approves additional applications, it will update the code integrity policy and (for unsigned LOB applications) the catalog.
Code integrity policies are supported by the HVCI service.
- VBS (hardware-based) protections, enabled.

• Code integrity policies in enforced mode, with UMCI enabled.
Lightly managed devices: Company-owned, but users are free to install software.
Devices are required to run organization's antivirus solution and client management tools.
Windows Defender Device Guard can be used to help protect the kernel, and to monitor (audit) for problem applications rather than limiting the applications that can be run. - VBS (hardware-based) protections, enabled. When enabled with a code integrity policy in audit mode only, VBS means the hypervisor helps enforce the default kernel-mode code integrity policy, which protects against unsigned drivers or system files.

• Code integrity policies, with UMCI enabled, but running in audit mode only. This means applications are not blocked—the policy just logs an event whenever an application outside the policy is started.
Bring Your Own Device: Employees are allowed to bring their own devices, and also use those devices away from work. Windows Defender Device Guard does not apply. Instead, you can explore other hardening and security features with MDM-based conditional access solutions, such as Microsoft Intune. N/A

Windows Defender Device Guard deployment in virtual machines

Windows Defender Device Guard can protect a Hyper-V virtual machine, just as it would a physical machine. The steps to enable Windows Defender Device Guard are the same from within the virtual machine.

Windows Defender Device Guard protects against malware running in the guest virtual machine. It does not provide additional protection from the host administrator. From the host, you can disable Windows Defender Device Guard for a virtual machine:

Set-VMSecurity -VMName <VMName> -VirtualizationBasedSecurityOptOut $true

Requirements for running Windows Defender Device Guard in Hyper-V virtual machines

  • The Hyper-V host must run at least Windows Server 2016 or Windows 10 version 1607.
  • The Hyper-V virtual machine must be Generation 2, and running at least Windows Server 2016 or Windows 10.
  • Windows Defender Device Guard and nested virtualization cannot be enabled at the same time.
  • Virtual Fibre Channel adapters are not compatible with Windows Defender Device Guard. Before attaching a virtual Fibre Channel Adapter to a virtual machine, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using Set-VMSecurity.
  • The AllowFullSCSICommandSet option for pass-through disks is not compatible with Windows Defender Device Guard. Before configuring a pass-through disk with AllowFullSCSICommandSet, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using Set-VMSecurity.

Reviewing your applications: application signing and catalog files

Typically, code integrity policies are configured to use the application's signing certificate as part or all of what identifies the application as trusted. This means that applications must either use embedded signing—where the signature is part of the binary—or catalog signing, where you generate a “catalog file” from the applications, sign it, and through the signed catalog file, configure the code integrity policy to recognize the applications as signed.

Catalog files can be very useful for unsigned LOB applications that cannot easily be given an embedded signature. However, catalogs need to be updated each time an application is updated. In contrast, with embedded signing, your code integrity policies typically do not have to be updated when an application is updated. For this reason, if code-signing is or can be included in your in-house application development process, it can simplify the management of your code integrity policies (compared to using catalog signing).

To obtain signed applications or embed signatures in your in-house applications, you can choose from a variety of methods:

  • Using the Windows Store publishing process. All apps that come out of the Microsoft Store are automatically signed with special signatures that can roll-up to our certificate authority (CA) or to your own.

  • Using your own digital certificate or public key infrastructure (PKI). ISV's and enterprises can sign their own Classic Windows applications themselves, adding themselves to the trusted list of signers.

  • Using a non-Microsoft signing authority. ISV's and enterprises can use a trusted non-Microsoft signing authority to sign all of their own Classic Windows applications.

To use catalog signing, you can choose from the following options:

Catalog files

Catalog files (which you can create in Windows 10 with a tool called Package Inspector) contain information about all deployed and executed binary files associated with your trusted but unsigned applications. When you create catalog files, you can also include signed applications for which you do not want to trust the signer but rather the specific application. After creating a catalog, you must sign the catalog file itself by using enterprise public key infrastructure (PKI), or a purchased code signing certificate. Then you can distribute the catalog, so that your trusted applications can be handled by code integrity policies in the same way as any other signed application.

Catalog files are simply Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA2) hash lists of discovered binaries. These binaries’ hash values are updated each time an application is updated, which requires the catalog file to be updated also.

After you have created and signed your catalog files, you can configure your code integrity policies to trust the signer or signing certificate of those files.

Note  Package Inspector only works on operating systems that support Windows Defender Device Guard, such as Windows 10 Enterprise, Windows 10 Education, Windows 2016 Server, or Windows Enterprise IoT.

For information about how creating catalog files fits into Windows Defender Device Guard deployment, see Planning and getting started on the Windows Defender Device Guard deployment process. For procedures for working with catalog files, see Deploy catalog files to support code integrity policies.

Code integrity policy formats and signing

When you generate a code integrity policy, you are generating a binary-encoded XML document that includes configuration settings for both the User and Kernel-modes of Windows 10 Enterprise, along with restrictions on Windows 10 script hosts. You can view your original XML document in a text editor, for example if you want to check the rule options that are present in the <Rules> section of the file.

We recommend that you keep the original XML file for use when you need to merge the code integrity policy with another policy or update its rule options. For deployment purposes, the file is converted to a binary format, which can be done using a simple Windows PowerShell command.

When the code integrity policy is deployed, it restricts the software that can run on a device. The XML document can be signed, helping to add additional protection against administrative users changing or removing the policy.